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ABSTRACT 
 
To supervise and guarantee a network security, the administrator uses different security components, such 
as firewalls, IDS and IPS. For a perfect interoperability between these components, they must be 
configured properly to avoid misconfiguration between them. Nevertheless, the existence of a set of 
anomalies between filtering rules and alerting rules, particularly in distributed multi-component 
architectures is very likely to degrade the network security. The main objective of this paper is to check if a 
set of security components are interoperable. A case study using a firewall and an IDS as examples will 
illustrate the usefulness of our approach. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Security components are crucial elements for a network security. They   have   been   widely    
deployed    to secure   networks. A security   component is   placed   in strategic points   of a 
network,   so   that,   all incoming and outgoing packets have to go through it [1, 2]. 
 
Generally, to enhance and guarantee the system safety, the administrator enforces the network 
security by distributing many security components over the network. This implies cohesion of the 
security functions supplied by these components. A misconfiguration or a conflict between 
security components set of rules means that a  security component , may either  accept  some  
malicious   packets,  which consequently    creates  security  holes ,   or discard    some   
legitimate    packets,   which   consequently disrupts   normal  traffic.  Both cases could cause 
irreparable consequences [3, 4].   
 
Unfortunately, it has  been  observed   that  most  security components  are poorly  designed  and  
have many  anomalies which implies many repercussions, both on their functioning and on their 
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interoperability, with other security components. Given the importance of the network security, 
such errors are not acceptable [5, 6]. 
 
Considering the impact of the poorly designed security component set of rules on the networks’ 
safety, it is necessary to[7, 8]: 
 
¯  Specify and check its set of rules correctness before its installation in a network.  
¯  Verify the security component  interoperability with other security components on the 
network. 
 
Several models are proposed for security components analysis[9,10,11].In our work, we propose a 
decision tree-based approach composed of three processes. In the first one, we verify and correct 
misconfigurations in the security component set of rules and generate a new set free of anomalies. 
In the second one,  we will check the interoperability between several security components in the 
network. If the interoperability between distributed security components in a network is not 
confirmed, we will apply a correction process which applies a formal model to guarantee the 
security components interoperability. 
 
The remaining parts of the paper are organized as follows; section 2 presents the proposed 
approach. Section 3 presents the security component set of rules extraction, verification and 
correction process steps. Section 4 presents the security components interoperability checking 
process steps. Section 5 presents the interoperability correction process steps and section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. THE PROPOSED APPROACH 
 
In order to verify the security components interoperability in distributed architectures, we propose 
an approach composed of the following processes (see figure 1):  
 
Initial process: Security components positioning checking 
There are several types of security components; filtering components and alerting ones. So, to 
guarantee the network security, the administrator installs, generally, filtering security components 
in strategic points (for example internet or traffic flowing from an external network). Then, as a 
complementary equipment of defense, the administrator installs an alerting security component. 
Therefore, the security components’ positioning is very important. Inversing this order creates 
security holes that will allow malicious traffic to sneak into the network.  Thus, the following 
processes are applicable to filtering/filtering, filtering/alerting or alerting/alerting security 
components. 
 
Process 1: Security components set of rules extraction, verification and correction 
This process is composed of the following steps: 
¯  Step A: Extraction of the security component set of rules 
¯  Step B: Formal security component set of rules checking 
¯  Step C: Formal security component set of rules correction 
 
Process 2: Security components interoperability checking 
This process is executed for a set of security components two by two. It is composed of the 
following steps: 
¯  Step D: Security components set of attributes extraction 
¯  Step E: Security components set of rules extension 
¯  Step F: Formal security components interoperability checking 
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Process 3: Security components interoperability correction 
This process is executed once the security components interoperability is not confirmed (see step 
F). It is composed of the following steps: 
 
Figure 1.The proposed interoperability checking approach 
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3. PROCESS 1: SECURITY COMPONENTS SET OF RULES 
EXTRACTION, VERIFICATION AND CORRECTION 
 
In this section, we will tack in details the security component set of rules extraction, verification 
and correction process (see process 1 in figure 1). This process aims to: 
-represent the security component set of rules into a standardized format, 
-verify the security component set of rules relevancy, 
-correct the security component set of rules incoherencies.   
These steps prepare the security component for interoperability verification with the specific 
security policy.  
 
3.1 Step A: Extraction of The Security Component Set of Rules (See Figure 1) 
In previous works [12], we have shown how to extract a security component set of rules from a 
security component log file. In the followings sub-sections, we will define the security 
component set of rules format. This format  will be represented by a decision tree approach for 
anomalies detection and correction in the next sections. 
 
3.1.1 Formal Security Component Set of Rules Representation 
For a security component Cx, having a set of t rules Rx ={r1,r2,….ri,…rt}, each rule is defined 
formally over a set of n attributes A1, A2, …, An. An is a specific attribute called decision attribute 
. We define a general rule format as follows:  
i 1,i 2,i j,i n 1,i n,ir  :[e e ...e e ] e−∧ ∧ ∧…∧ →  
where: 
- ej,i with 1 ≤ j≤ n-1 is the value of attribute Aj in the rule ri . It can be a single value (for       
example: UDP, 80,...) or a range of values (for example: [192.120.30.30/24,192.120.30.50/24]). 
ej,i ⊆ Dj where Dj  is the domain of the attribute Aj with1≤ j≤n-1. For instance, for an attribute A1= 
"protocol", its attribute domain is { }1D = UDP,TCP,ICMP and e1,1="UDP". 
- 1,i 2,i j,i n 1,i[e e ...e e ]−∧ ∧ ∧…∧ is the conjunctive set of the rule ri attributes values with 1≤ j≤n-
1. 
- en,i is a specific value of the attribute An. It takes its value from the set of values {accept, deny, 
discard, pass}. 
 
Example 1: 
Let’s take a security component Cx. If we suppose A1 and A2, respectively, the attributes "source 
address" and "destination address", and if we suppose that D1: [192.120.*.*/24],                                      
D2: [128.160.*.*/24] and D3= {accept, deny}, we can define a rule ri with IP addresses 
[192.120.30.*/24]that accepts access for hosts belonging to D1 to access to hosts with IP 
addresses [128.160.40.*/24] belonging to D2, as follows: 
∧ →ir : 192.120.30.* /24 128.160.40.* /24 accept  
We can define the following properties: 
 
Property 1: 
Let's take an IP packet P and  p1,p2,…..pm the packet  header fields (with 1 m n 1)≤ ≤ − . We say that 
the IP packet P verifies a rule  
i 1,i 2,i j,i n 1,i n,ir  :[e e ...e e ] e−∧ ∧ ∧…∧ → in the security component 
Cx, if ∈ ∧ ∈ ∧ ∧ ∈1 1,i 2 2,i m m,ip e p e ….. p e .  
For example, the IP packet [ ] [ ]( )∧P : 192.120.30.5 / 24 128.160.40.25 / 24  verifies the rule ri (see 
Example 1). 
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Property 2: 
We say that a security component Cx with t rules {r1, r2 ….rt}  is reliable if, for any IP packet P, 
there exists one rule ri in Cx ( )1 i t≤ ≤  that verifies the packet (see property 1). 
3.1.2 The Decision Tree Approach 
We propose to use the decision tree model to describe a security component Cx set of rules. A 
decision tree is a formal representation defined by 3 types of entities (see figure 2): 
¯  Nodes: represent the different attributes of a rule. They are schematized by labeled 
rectangles in the tree. 
¯  Edges: connect the decision tree nodes. They are labeled by  values or a range of values 
taken from the parent node domain. They are schematized by a labeled and directed 
arrow from the parent node to the outgoing nodes. 
¯  Leaves: are terminal nodes representing the path identification. They are schematized by 
a labeled circle in the tree. 
 
We can represent a security component Cx with t rules by a decision tree where each path from 
the root to a terminal node represents a rule of Cx. Those paths are called branches bi 
with ti1 ≤≤ . So, a decision tree DT with the attributes A1,A2,…..An is a tree that satisfies the 
following conditions: 
¯  The root of the tree representing the attribute A1 is labeled by A1,w where w  represents the 
branch bw in the decision tree DT with tw1 ≤≤  and t represents the number of DT 
branches. 
¯  For example, in figure 2, the root is labeled by A1,1= A1,2= A1,3= A1,4=...= A1,t= 
“Protocol”. 
¯  Each non-terminal node representing the attribute Am, is  denoted Am,w where m 
(1 m n )≤ ≤ represents its level in the tree and w  (1 w t)≤ ≤  the belonging of the node to 
the branch bw.  
¯  For example, in figure 2, nodes in the second level are labeled by A2,1= A2,2= A2,3= 
A2,4=“Source port”. 
¯  Each edge, connecting two nodes Am and Am+1 which represents the attribute Am value  is 
denoted em,w where m  (1 m n)≤ ≤  represents the level in the tree and  w  (1 w t)≤ ≤  the 
branch in the tree.  
¯  For example, in figure 2, we note “UDP” and “ICMP” the labeled edges connecting the 
attributes “Protocol” and “Source port”. 
¯  Each terminal node is labeled with the specific value "Null". It represents the termination 
of a branch in the decision tree DT. 
¯  Each path in the decision tree from the root to the leaf is identified by the branch 
identification bw ( ) 1 w t≤ ≤  (see figure 2). 
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Figure 2. A decision tree representation 
We define the set of labeled edges belonging to a level m in DT as follows: 
em={ em,1, em,2,……. em,t } . We note that em  is  a sub-set of Dm (domain of Am). For example, in 
figure 2, the set of labeled edges belonging to the level 2 is: e2={e2,1=«80 », e2,2=«20 », e2,3=«23» 
and e2,4=«any»} 
A rule rw is represented  in a decision tree DT by a branch bw as follows: 
bw:   A1,w-e1,w-A2,w-e2,w… Am,w-em,w ……… An,w-en,w-Null  with nm1 ≤≤ and tw1 ≤≤  
 
Based on (1), we define the suffix_node of bw  as follows: 
Suffix_node(bw,Ai,w )= Ai,w-ei,w… Am,w-em,w ……… An,w-en,w-Null   
with  1 i n-1≤ ≤ and tw1 ≤≤ . The Suffix_node(bw,Ai,w) function returns the postfix of bw from 
the node Ai,w.  
 
Also, based on (1), we define the suffix_edge of bw  as follows: 
Suffix_edge(bw,ei,w)= ei,w… Am,w-em,w ……… An,w-en,w-Null  with  1 i n-1≤ ≤ and tw1 ≤≤  
The Suffix_edge(bw,ei,w) function returns the postfix of bw from the edge ei,w.  
 
A branch bw in the decision tree DT represents the rule rw as follows:  
∧ ∧ →w 1,w 2,w n-1,w n,wr : e e .....e e with ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆1,w 1 2,w 2 n-1,w n-1 n,w ne  D ,e  D ,.....e D ,e D  
For example, in figure 2, the branch 
b2 : A1,2=  “Protocol”- e1,2= “UDP”- A2,2=”Source port” - e2,2= “20”- A3,2=”Action “-
e3,2= “Accept” -Null  
represents  the following rule: ∧ →UDP 20 accept   
with ∈ ∈ ∈UDP  "Protocol", 20  "Source  port", accept "Action"  
 
In figure 2, we note that in the decision tree DT, b2 and b3 have the same prefixes; the attributes 
A1,1= A1,2="Protocol"  and A2,1= A2,2="Source port" . Also, the labeled edges e1,1= e1,2="TCP". 
This is due to the fact that they share, respectively, the same node and the same branch. So, b2 can 
also be written as follows: 
b2 : A1,1=  “Protocol”- e1,1= “UDP”- A2,1=”Source port” -e2,2= “20”- A3,2=”Action “- 
e3,2= “Accept”-Null 
3.1.3 Case study: Security component set of rules extraction 
Let’s take a firewall FW as security component. By applying the set of rules extraction process on 
FW log file [12], we obtain the following set of rules (see step A in figure 3). 
 
International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC) Vol.5, No.5, September 2013 
101 
 
 
Figure 3. The  firewall FW set of extracted rules RFW 
 
Using the decision tree approach described previously (see section 3.1.2), we represent the 
firewall FW  set of rules  RFW  by a decision tree  DTFW as follows (see figure 4): 
 
 
Figure 4. DTFW:  The firewall FW decision tree 
where: 
b1:“TCP-[140.192.10.1,140.192.10.100]-any-[129.170.20.20,129.170.20.100]-any-deny-Null” in 
DTFW  
corresponds to the rule r1 in the set of rules RFW. 
b2 :“TCP- [140.192.10.20,140.192.10.50]-any-[129.170.20.20,129.170.20.70]-any-accept-Null” in 
DTFW 
corresponds to the rule r2 in the set of rules RFW. 
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b3 : “TCP- [140.192.10.1,140.192.10.60]-any-[129.170.20.20,129.170.20.100]-any-deny-Null” in 
DTFW 
corresponds to the rule r3 in the set of rules RFW. 
b4 :”TCP-[140.192.10.1,140.192.10.100]-any-[129.170.20.30,129.170.20.100]-any-accept-Null”in 
DTFW  corresponds to the rule r4 in the set of rules RFW. 
 
3.2 Step B: Formal Security Component Set Of Rules Checking (See Figure 1)  
 
Let's take a  security component Cx. In order to study the security component Cx set of rules 
correctness, we have chosen to represent it by a decision tree. This representation will allow us 
to have a better illustration of the security component. Several works [13,14,15] have defined a 
set of anomalies detectable between rules in a security component called “component 
anomalies”.In the following, we will study these anomalies using the decision tree formalism. 
Then, we will propose a formal method to remove them. 
 
3.2.1 Formalization Of Relations Between Rules 
 
Let’s take a decision tree DT composed of t branches (representing t rules). As mentioned above 
(see section 3.1.2), a branch bi corresponding to a rule ri in DT is formalized as follows: 
≤ ≤ ≤ ≤i 1,i 1,i m,i m,i n,i n,ib :  A e ....A e ....A e Null   with 1 i t and 1 m n  
In [13,14], the authors have defined the followings definitions:  
 
Definition1: Rules  ri and  rj are  exactly  matching  if every  field  in  ri is  equal  to  its  
corresponding  field  in  rj . Formally, jEMi r  r ℜ if  ∀ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤j m i m 1 m n - 1,  r [A ] = r [A ]  with  1 i < j t .  
In the same way, we define that branches bi and  bj are  exactly  matching  if every  labeled edge  
in  bi is  equal  to  its  corresponding  labeled edge  in  bj . Formally, ℜi EM jb   b if  
∀ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤m,j m,i 1 m n - 1,  e = e  with  1 i < j t .  
 
Definition2: Rules ri and rj are inclusively matching if they do not exactly match and if every 
field in ri is a subset or  equal  to  its  corresponding  field  in  rj.  ri is  called  the subset while rj is 
called the superset.  
Formally, jIMi r  r ℜ if  ∀ ≤ ≤ ⊆ ≤ ≤i m j m 1 m n - 1,  r [A ] r [A ] with  1 i < j t .  
In the same way, we define that branches bi and bj are inclusively matching if they do not exactly 
match and if every labeled edge  in bi is a subset or  equal  to  its  corresponding  labeled edge  in  
bj.  bi is  called  the subset while bj is called the superset. Formally, jIMi b  b ℜ if 
∀ ≤ ≤ ⊆ ≤ ≤m,i m,j 1 m n - 1,  e e  with  1 i < j t  
 
Definition3:  Rules ri  and rj are correlated if some fields in  ri   are  subsets  or  equal  to  the  
corresponding  fields  in rj  ,  and  the  rest  of  the  fields  in  ri are  supersets  of  its 
corresponding fields in rj. Formally,  cℜi jr  r if 
∀ ≤ ≤ ⊂ ∨ ⊃ ∨ ≤ ≤i m j m i m j m i m j m 1 m n - 1, (r [A ] r [A ])  (r [A ] r [A ] ) (r [A ] = r [A ] ) with  1 i < j t  
In the same way, we define that branches bi  and bj are correlated if some labeled edges in  bi   are  
subsets  or  equal  to  its  corresponding  labeled edges in bj  ,  and  the  rest  of  the  labeled edges 
in  bi are  supersets  of  the corresponding labeled edges in bj. Formally, jci b  b ℜ if 
∀ ≤ ≤ ⊂ ∨ ⊃ ∨ ≤ ≤
m,i m,j m,i m, j m,i m,j
 1 m n - 1,(e e ) (e e ) (e = e ) with  1 i < j t  
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Definition4:  Rules ri  and rj are disjoints if there exist at least one field in ri different from its 
corresponding field in rj. Formally, i D jr   rℜ  if ∃ ≤ ≤ = ≤ < ≤/m 1 m n-1, [A ]  ) with  1  i j m(r r[A ] i j t  
In the same way, we define that branches bi  and bj are disjoints if there exist at least a labeled 
edge in bi different from its corresponding labeled edge in bj.  Formally, i D jb   bℜ if  
i j t∃ ≤ ≤ ≤ < ≤/m,i m,j 1 m n - 1,(e = e ) with  1   
 
3.2.2 Security Components Anomalies Detection 
 
An anomaly in a security component is the result of the following cases [16,17]: 
¯  The existence of two or more rules that may match the same packet  
¯  The existence of a rule that can never match any packet on the network paths that cross 
the security component.  
In the following , we classify different anomalies that may exist between rules in a security 
component. 
 
Property 3: Shadowing Anomaly 
In a set of rules R, a rule rj is shadowed by a previous rule ri when ri matches all the packets that 
match rj, such that the shadowed rule rj will never be activated. In a decision tree DT, for any two 
branches bi and bj with ≤ ≤1 i < j t , bj  is shadowed by  bi if and only if, j IM i n,j n,i(b   b  ) (e e )ℜ ∧ ≠  
 
Property 4: Generalization Anomaly 
The generalization anomaly is the reverse of the shadowing anomaly i.e. in a set of rules R, a rule 
rj is a generalization of a preceding  rule ri if, on the one hand,  the  rule  rj can  match  all  the  
packets  that  match  the  rule rj and, on the other hand, the two rules have different actions. 
In a decision tree DT , for any two branches bi and bj with ≤ ≤1 i < j t , bj  is a generalization of bi 
if and only if, 
i IM j n,i n,j (b   b ) (e e ) ℜ ∧ ≠  
Property 5: Redundancy Anomaly 
In a set of rules R, a  rule rj is redundant to a rule ri  if rj performs the same action on the same 
packets as ri . In the way, if the redundant rule rj is removed, the safety of the security component  
will not be affected. In a decision tree DT, for any two branches bi and bj with ≤ ≤1 i < j t , bj is 
redundant to bi if and only if, j IM i n,i n,j (b   b  ) (e =e ) ℜ ∧  
Property 6: Correlation Anomaly 
In a set of rules R, two rules rj and ri are correlated if, on the one hand, the first rule rj matches 
some packets that match the second rule ri , and the second rule ri matches some packets that 
match the first rule rj and, on the other hand, the two rules have different actions.  
In a decision tree DT, for any two branches bi and bj with ≤ ≤1 i < j t , bj and bi are correlated if 
and only if, 
i c j n,i n,j(b   b ) (e e ) ℜ ∧ ≠  
3.2.3 Case study: Security Component Anomalies Detection 
In our case study, in figure 4, we note that the firewall FW  contains some misconfigurations 
between its rules: 
- b2 (representing r2) is shadowed by b1 (representing r1).  More precisely:  
∧ ⊂ ∧ ∧ ⊂ ∧ ∧ ≠
1,2 1,1 2,2 2,1 3,2 3,1 4,2 4,1 5,2 5,1 6,2 6,1
(e = e ) (e e ) ( e = e )  (e e ) (e = e ) (e e )  
Also, in the same figure, b4 (representing r4) is shadowed by b1 (representing r1). More 
precisely: ∧ ∧ ∧ ⊂ ∧ ∧ ≠
1,4 1,1 2,4 2,1 3,4 3,,1 4,4 4,1 5,4 5,1 6,4 6,1
(e = e ) (e = e )  (e = e )  (e e ) (e = e ) (e e )  
- b3 (representing r3) is a generalization of b2 (representing r2). More precisely:  
∧ ⊂ ∧ ∧ ∧ ∧ ≠1,2 1,3 2,2 2,3 3,2 3,3 4,2 4,3 5,2 5,3 6,2 6,3(e = e ) (e e )  (e = e )  (e = e ) (e = e ) (e e )  
- b3 (representing r3) is redundant to b1 (representing r1). More precisely: 
International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC) Vol.5, No.5, September 2013 
104 
 
∧ ⊂ ∧ ∧ ∧ ∧
1,3 1,1 2,3 2,1 3,3 3,1 4,3 4,1 5,1 5,3 6,3 6,1
(e = e ) (e e )  (e = e )  (e = e ) (e = e ) (e = e )  
- b3 (representing r3) is correlated to b4 (representing r4). More precisely:  
∧ ⊂ ∧ ∧ ⊃ ∧ ∧ ≠1,3 1,4 2,3 2,4 3,3 3,4 4,3 4,4 5,3 5,4 6,3 6,4(e = e ) (e e )  (e = e )   (e e ) (e = e ) (e e )  
In the next section, we will present a new approach to remove them. 
 
3.3 Step C: Formal security component set of rules correction (see figure 1) 
By studying the previous anomalies properties on the decision tree (see section 3.2.2), we propose 
a fundamental property guarantying that the decision tree is free of anomalies. We call this 
property the “relevancy property”.  
 
Property 7: Relevancy  
let's take a decision tree DT with t branches. 
m,w m,i m,i+kG(A ) = { e  ,…., e }  is the set of all k (k>1) 
outgoing labeled edges from the node Am,w with k-ti ≤≤1 .The decision tree DT is relevant, if 
and only if for any two edges em,i and em,j  belonging to G(Am,w), we have: 
 ∩ φ ∧ ∈ ∧ ∈   m,i m, j k,i k z,i ze  e = e D  e D   
where k represents the "source address" attribute and z represents the "destination address" 
attribute. 
 
For example, in figure 2, the node A1,1 (noted also “protocol”) has two outgoing edges labeled                     
e1,1 =“UDP” and e1,4 =“ICMP”. Thus, G(A1,1)= { e1,1 ,e1,4 }. We note that ∩ φ1,1 1,4e  e =  
 
We can prove that a decision tree verifying the relevancy property (property 7) is free of the 
anomalies presented above (see properties 3 to 6 in section 3.2.2). 
 
Lemma 1: 
 
A decision tree DT verifying the relevancy property doesn’t contain the previous anomalies (i.e. 
the shadowing anomaly, the generalization anomaly, the correlation anomaly and the redundancy 
anomaly) (see section 3.2.2). 
 
For example, the decision tree of figure 4 is non-relevant because branches b1 and b2 verify the 
shadowing anomaly.  
A similar reasoning on properties 4, 5 and 6 proves that a decision tree with the generalization 
anomaly, the redundancy anomaly and the correlation anomaly is a non-relevant decision tree. 
 
To remove the decision tree DT misconfigurations, we will build another decision tree called 
Relevant Decision Tree (RDT) which verifies the relevancy property (see property 7). The 
proposed RDT will be presented in the next section. 
 
3.3.1 The Relevant decision Tree (RDT):  
 
In the following sub-sections, we first start by explaining the RDT construction principle 
informally, then we will present it with a formal algorithm. To do that, we need to take into 
account some assumptions: 
 
Assumption 1: 
In a security component Cx with a set of t rules Rx (r1,r2,....ri,...rt),  if a rule ri is applicable for an 
IP paquet, so the remaining set of rules i.e rules from ri+1 to rt is ignored. This assumption 
preserve the set of rules order during the RDT construction algorithm treatement. 
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Assumption 2: 
In a security component Cx with a set of t rules Rx (r1,r2,....ri,...rt),   if there are anomalies between 
ri and ri+1, ri+1 will be corrected according to ri. This assuption ensure that all rules in a security 
component have the same importance. 
 
3.3.2 The RDT construction  
In this section, we will take some examples to explain the principle of decision tree branches' 
construction. The decision tree construction will be done recursively and will be explained in the 
decision tree construction algorithm (see section 3.3.3). 
 
Let’s take a security component Cx with a set of 2 rules Rx {r1, r2} having the following format: 
∧ →1 1,1 2,1 3,1r : e e e with ⊆ ⊆ ⊆1,1 1 2,1 2 3,1 3e  D ,e  D ,e D  
∧ →2 1,2 2,2 3,2r : e e e with ⊆ ⊆ ⊆1,2 1 2,2 2 3,2 3e  D ,e  D ,e D  
 
where D1=[1-30] represents the "source address" (Src adr) domain,  D2 represents the 
"destination address" (Dest adr) domain and D3 represents the "Action" (Action) domain. The 
RDT construction algorithm builds the first branch b1 (representing the first rule r1) of the tree, 
and then joins b2 (representing the rule r2) to the tree. There are several cases to study: 
 
-Case 1:
1 D 2r rℜ : Let’s take, for example, the set of 2 rules Rx {r1, r2} where: 
∧ →1 1,1 2,1 3,1r : e = [7 - 15] e e  
∧ →2 1,2 2,2 3,2r : e = [20 - 30] e e  
First, we build the first branch b1 (representing r1) of the tree; this latter has the following format:   
[A1,1-e1,1-A2,1-e2,1-A3,1-e3,1-Null] (see step1 in figure 5.a). Next, we consider how to join b2 
(representing r2) to the tree. We note that ∩ φ1,2 1,1e e = . However, for any packet whose value 
of attribute A1 is in the set  [7-15] , it does not match r2. Thus, we proceed as follows: 
¯  We make a new edge in the tree from A1,2 (A1,2=A1,1) labeled e1,2=[20-30] (see step2 in 
figure 5.a). 
¯  We build Suffix_node(b2,A2,2) that we attach to the node e1,2 (see step3 in figure 5.a). 
¯  We update the decision tree structure notation. 
 
Figure 5.a Case 1: r1 RD r2 
-Case 2: 1 IM 2r rℜ : Let’s take, for example, the set of 2 rules Rx {r1, r2} where: 
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∧ →
1 1,1 2,1 3,1
r : e = [7 - 15] e e  
∧ →2 1,2 2,2 3,2r : e = [7 - 20] e e  
 
We first build the first branch b1 (representing r1) of the tree; this latter has the following format:   
[A1,1-e1,1-A2,1-e2,1-A3,1-e3,1-Null] (see step1 in figure 5.b). Next, we consider how to join b2 
(representing r2) to the tree. We note that ⊂1,1 1,2e e . However, for any packet whose value of 
attribute is in the set [7-15], it may match the first rule r1, and it also may match r2. Thus,  
¯  We make a new edge in the tree from A1,2 (A1,2=A1,1) labeled 1,2 1,2 1,1e = [e - e ] . 
¯  We build Suffix_node(b2,A2,2) that we attach to the edge e1,2 (see step2 in figure 5.b) .   
¯  We attach Suffix_edge(b2,e2,2) to the node to which e1,1  points to(see step3 in figure 5.b). 
¯  We update the decision tree structure notation. 
 
Figure 5.b Case 2: r1 RIM r2 
-Case 3: 2 IM 1r rℜ : Let’s take, for example, the set of 2 rules Rx {r1, r2} where: 
 
∧ →
1 1,1 2,1 3,1
r : e = [7 - 15] e e  
∧ →2 1,2 2,2 3,2r : e = [8 - 12] e e  
 
We first build the first branch b1 (representing r1) of the tree; this latter has the following format:   
[A1,1-e1,1-A2,1-e2,1-A3,1-e3,1-Null] (see step1 in figure 5.c). Next, we consider how to join b2 
(representing r2) to the tree. We note that ⊂1,2 1,1e e . However, for any packet whose value of 
attribute is in the set [8-12], it matches r1. Thus, we proceed as follows: 
¯  We make a new edge in the tree from A1,2 (A1,2=A1,1) labeled ∩1,2 1,1 1,2e = [e  e ]  
¯  We build Suffix_node(b2,A2,2) that we attach to the node e1,2 (see step2 in figure 5.c).  
¯  We attach Suffix_edge(b1,A2,1) to the node to which e1,2 points to(see step3 in figure 5.c).  
¯  The edge e1,1  will be renamed 1,1 1,1 1,2e = [e - e ] .  
¯  We update the decision tree structure notation. 
International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC) Vol.5, No.5, September 2013 
107 
 
 
Figure 5.c Case 3: r2 RIM r1 
 
-Case 4:
1 C 2r rℜ : Let’s take, for example, the set of 2 rules Rx {r1, r2} where: 
∧ →1 1,1 2,1 3,1r : e = [7 - 15] e e  
∧ →2 1,2 2,2 3,2r : e = [10 - 20] e e  
 
We first build the first branch b1 (representing r1) of the tree; this latter has the following format:   
[A1,1-e1,1-A2,1-e2,1-A3,1-e3,1-Null] (see step1 in figure 5.d). Next, we consider how to join b2 
(representing r2) to the tree. We note that  and  ⊄ ⊄1,2 1,1 1,1 1,2e e e e . However, for any packet 
whose value of attribute is in the set [10-20], it matches values of a sub-set in the set [7-15] . As 
long as, any packet whose value of attribute is in the set [7-15], it matches values of a sub-set in 
the  set [10-20]. Thus, we proceed as follows: 
¯  We make 2 new edges in the tree; the first one from A1,2 (A1,2=A1,1) labeled 
1,2 1,2 1,1e = [ e - e ] . The second one from A1,3 (A1,3=A1,2=A1,1) labeled ∩1,3 1,2 1,1 e = [e  e ] .  
¯  We build Suffix_node(b2,A2,2) that we attach on one hand, to the new edge e1,2, and on the 
other hand, to the edge e1,3  . 
¯
 We join Suffix_edge(b2, e2,2) to the node to which  e1,1 points to(see step2 in figure 5.d). 
We attach Suffix_edge(b1,e2,1) to the node to which e1,3  point to.  
¯  The edge e1,1  will be renamed 1,1 1,1 1,2e =[e -e ]  (see step3 in figure 5.d).  
¯  We update the decision tree structure notation. 
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Figure 5.d Case 4: r1 RC r2 
-Case 5: 1 EM 2r rℜ : Let’s take, for example, the set of 2 rules Rx {r1, r2} where: 
∧ →
1 1,1 2,1 3,1
r : e = [7 - 15] e e  
∧ →2 1,2 2,2 3,2r : e = [7 - 15] e e  
 
We first build the first branch b1 (representing r1) of the tree; this latter has the following format:   
[A1,1-e1,1-A2,1-e2,1-A3,1-e3,1-Null] (see step1 in figure 5.e). Next, we consider how to join b2 
(representing r2) to the tree. We note that 1,2 1,1 e = e . However, the two branches share the same 
edge value. In this case,  
¯  We skip this node A1,1 and look for the node A2,1(see step2 in figure 5.e).  
¯  According to the several cases presented above (see cases 1,2,3 and 4), we attach                     
Suffix_edge(b2,e2,2) to A2,1 (see step3 in figure 5.e). 
¯  We update the decision tree structure notation. 
 
Figure 5.e Case 4: r1 REM r2 
 
3.3.3 Case Study: Security Component Set Of Rules Correction  
In this section, we apply the RDT construction principle on the firewall FW  set of rules in figure 
3. Figure 6 illustrates RDTFW  the relevant decision tree of the set of rules  RFW. 
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Figure 6. RDTFW: The firewall FW  relevant decision tree 
 
Now, we convert the RDTFW branches into a set of rules. Based on Lemma 1, we note that these 
rules are free of anomalies (see table 1). 
 
Table 1. The firewall FW  set of relevant rules 
 
4. Security Components Interoperability Checking (Process 2) 
Let’s take a distributed network composed of two relevants security components: the firewall 
"FW" and an intrusion detection system "IDS". Now, we will study FW and IDS interoperability 
in the network. To do that, we will study if there are misconfigurations between them. 
 
4.1 Step D: Security Components Set Of Attributes Extraction (See Figure 1) 
Let’s suppose that FW and  IDS are composed, respectively, of the set of rules RFW  and R IDS . RFW 
is a set of t rules {r1,r2,….ri,…rt} where i  is the relative position of a rule within RFW. As far as, R 
IDS is a set of z rules {q1,q2,….qj,…qz} where j  is the relative position of a rule within RIDS. 
Each rule ri belonging to RFW has the following attributes: AttFW={ Protocol, Source address, 
Destination address, Source port, Destination port} (see table 1). In the same way, each rule qj 
belonging to RIDS has the following attributes: AttIDS= {Packet length, Protocol, Source address, 
Destination address, Source port, Destination port, Attack class}. Table 2 presents the  IDS set of 
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rules RIDS . Based in table 1 and table 2, we note that the two security components FW and  IDS 
differ in attributes number.  
 
 
Table 2. The intrusion detection system  IDS set of relevants rules 
 
4.2 Step E: Security components set of rules extension (see figure 1) 
To be able to check FW and  IDS interoperability in a network, they must share the same 
attributes. For that, we will extend the firewall FW set of rules format by adding the 
complementary attributes from  the intrusion detection system IDS set of rules format and vice 
versa. The extended rules format, taking into account FW and  IDS attributes is the following:  
{ }               FW IDSAtt Att Packet length, Pr otocol, Src. address, Src port, Dest. Address, Dest. Port, Attack Class, Action∪ =
Applying the extended format to FW set of rules, we obtain the following extended set of rules 
(see table 3). We note that for each attribute which has not a specific value, we put in the 
corresponding field “All”. “All” means that this field accepts any value defined in the attribute’s 
domain. The intrusion detection system IDS set of rules remains unchanged seeing that its set of 
attributes are conform to the extended rule format. 
 
Table 3. The firewall FW set of extended rules 
 
 
 
4.3 Step F: Formal Security Components Interoperability Checking (See Figure 1) 
Several works [13,14,15] have defined a set of anomalies detectable between rules in distributed 
security components called “distributed component anomalies”. In the following, we will study 
these anomalies using the decision tree formalism. Then, we will propose a formal method to 
remove them. 
 
Definition 5: 
Let's take a network composed of a set of distributed hosts and several security components. Let a 
traffic stream flowing from sub-domain Domx to sub-domain Domy across two security 
components Cx and Cy installed on the network path between the two sub-domains (see figure 7) 
[14,15]. At any point on this path in the direction of flow, Cx is called the preceeding security 
component whereas Cy is called a following security component.  
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Figure 7. The distributed architecture 
4.3.1 Distributed Security Components Anomalies Detection 
In this section, we classify anomalies that may exist between rules in multi-security component 
environments. Let’s take a rule ri  ( 1 i t )≤ ≤ belonging to the preceding security component Cx set 
of rules Dx, and a rule qj  ( 1 j z )≤ ≤ belonging to the following security component Cy set of rules 
Dy. We assume that every security component is relevant.  
 
Property 8: Inter-Shadowing Anomaly  
Let's take two security components Cx and Cy . A shadowing anomaly occurs if the preceding 
security component Cx blocks the network traffic accepted by the following security component 
Cy. In the decision tree representation, for any two branches bi and bj  belonging respectively to 
RDTCx and RDTCy , bi  is shadowed by  bi  if and only if,  
 
     j Cy IM i Cx n,i n,j(b RDT ) (b RDT ) (e deny / reject) (e accept / pass)∈ ℜ ∈ ∧ = ∧ =  
Property 9: Inter-Spuriousness Anomaly 
Let's take two security components Cx and Cy. A spuriousness anomaly (also called 
misconnection anomaly) occurs if the preceding security component Cx permits the network 
traffic denied by the following security component Cy. In the decision tree representation, for any 
two branches bi and bj belonging respectively to RDTCx and RDTCy , bi  allows a spurious traffic to  
bj if and only if, 
 
     j Cy IM i Cx n,i n,j(b RDT ) (b RDT ) (e accept / pass) (e deny / reject)∈ ℜ ∈ ∧ = ∧ =  
Property 10: Inter-Redundancy Anomaly 
Let's take two security components Cx and Cy . A redundancy anomaly occurs if the following 
component Cy denies the network traffic already blocked by an preceding component Cx. In the 
decision tree representation, for any two branches bi  and bj  belonging respectively to RDTCx and 
RDTCy , bj  is redundant to  bi if and only if, 
 
     i Cx IM j Cy n,i n,j(b RDT ) (b RDT ) (e deny / reject) (e deny / reject)∈ ℜ ∈ ∧ = ∧ =  
Property 11: Inter-Correlation Anomaly  
Let's take two security components Cx and Cy . A correlation anomaly occurs as a result of having 
two correlated rules in the preceding and following components. As defined in section 3.2.2, a 
security component has a correlated rules only if these rules have different filtering actions. 
However, correlated rules having any action are always a source of anomaly in distributed 
components because of the implied rule resulting from the conjunction of the correlated rules. 
This creates not only ambiguity in the inter-components set of rules, but also spurious, and 
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shadowing anomalies. In the decision tree representation, for any two branches bi and bj  
belonging respectively to RDTCx and RDTCy , bj and bi are correlated if and only if, 
 
     i Cx C j Cy n,i n,j(b RDT ) (b RDT ) (e accept / pass) (e deny / reject)∈ ℜ ∈ ∧ = ∧ =  
or 
     i Cx C j Cy n,i n,j(b RDT ) (b RDT ) (e deny / reject) (e accept / pass)∈ ℜ ∈ ∧ = ∧ =  
 
Property 12: Interoperability 
 
Security components in a distributed system are interoperable, if and only if, for any two security 
components (Cx,Cy) where Cx is the preceding security component and Cy is the following security 
component, there are no anomalies between them (inter-shadowing anomaly, inter-spuriousness 
anomaly, inter-redundancy anomaly and inter-correlation anomaly) 
 
4.3.2 Case study: Distributed Security Components Anomalies Detection 
 
In our case study, based on table 2 and table 3, we note that the firewall FW and the intrusion 
detection system IDS contain some misconfigurations between their rules: 
- b5 in RDTFW (representing r5 in FW) allows a spurious traffic to b2 in RDTIDS 
(representing r2 in IDS). More precisely: 
1,5 FW 1,2 IDS 2,5 FW 2,2 IDS 3,5 FW 3,2 IDS
4,5 FW 4,2 IDS 5,5 FW 5,2 IDS 6,5 FW 6,2 IDS
7,5 FW 7,2
(e RDT ) (e RDT ) (e RDT ) (e RDT ) (e RDT ) (e RDT )
(e RDT ) (e RDT ) (e RDT e RDT ) (e RDT e RDT )
(e RDT ) (e
∈ = ∈ ∧ ∈ = ∈ ∧ ∈ ⊃ ∈ ∧          
∈ = ∈ ∧ ∈ ⊃ ∈ ∧ ∈ = ∈ ∧          
∈ ⊃
IDS 8,5 FW 8,2 IDS
RDT ) (e RDT ) (e RDT )∈ ∧ ∈ ≠ ∈      
 
- b2 in RDTFW (representing r2 in FW) is correlated with b1 in RDT IDS (representing r1 in 
IDS). More precisely: 
 
 
1,2 FW 1,1 IDS 2,2 FW 2,1 IDS 3,2 FW 3,1 IDS
4,2 FW 4,1 IDS 5,2 FW 5,1 IDS 6,2 FW 6,1 IDS
7,2 FW
(e RDT ) (e RDT ) (e RDT ) (e RDT ) (e RDT ) (e RDT )
(e RDT ) (e RDT ) (e RDT ) (e RDT ) (e RDT ) (e RDT )
(e RDT )
∈ = ∈ ∧ ∈ = ∈ ∧ ∈ ⊃ ∈ ∧          
∈ = ∈ ∧ ∈ ⊂ ∈ ∧ ∈ = ∈ ∧          
∈
7,1 IDS 8,2 FW 8,1 IDS
(e RDT ) (e RDT ) (e RDT )⊃ ∈ ∧ ∈ ≠ ∈      
 
Thus, they don’t verify property 12. Therefore, they are non-interoperable in the network. In the 
next section, we will present a novel approach to remove these conflicts in order to guarantee 
their perfect interoperability between FW and  IDS.(see process 3 in figure 1). 
 
5. Security Components Interoperability Correction (Process 3) 
 
The interoperability correction process guarantees the perfect interoperability between security 
components in a network. It is composed of the followings steps: 
 
5.1 Step G: Security Components Set Of Rules Integration (See Figure 1) 
 
In this step, we will put together the two security components set of rules in order to detect and 
correct misconfigurations between them (See step G in figure 1). For that, considering that the 
firewall is the preceding security component and the intrusion detection system is the following 
security component, we add  IDS set of rules to those of FW. Eventually, we will update  IDS set 
of rules order to get a coherent global set of rules (see column “Rules” in table 4).  
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Table 4. The global set of rules 
 
5.2 Step H: Formal Global Set Of Rules Correction (See Figure 1) 
 
In this step, we will correct the global set of rules using the relevant decision tree formalism 
presented above (See section 3.3). The correction step consists in focusing on the set of rules and 
generating a new one free of anomalies (see example in section 3.3.3). 
 
5.3 Step I: Specific Security Component Set Of Rules Extraction From The Global 
Set Of Rules (See Figure 1) 
 
To get a specific security component set of rules, we must extract it from the global one. From 
the returned relevant decision tree in step H, (see section 5.2)
 
we will extract a sub-tree which 
represents the specific  security component set of rules. This extraction is based on the specific 
security component predefined attributes. In the following section, we will define a projection 
operator which accepts, as input, a set of predefined security component set of attributes and the 
global security set of rules, and returns, as output,  a specific security component set of rules in 
the form of a decision tree (see step I in figure 1). 
 
5.3.1 The Projection Operator 
 
Let's take  an RDT composed of t branches and Attx={A1,A2,…..,An} set of n attributes belonging 
to a security component Cx. In order to extract, from RDT , a sub-decision tree DRTX, we define 
an operator called “component projection” and denoted “ 
 
“
  
as follows: 
 ( , ) →X XRDT Att RDTpi  (20) 
This operator removes all branches in RDTX whose attributes Ai does not belong to AttX and their 
corresponding labeled value ≠i, j(e All) .  
 
Lemma 3 
 
The component projection  preserves the relevancy property. 
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Applying the projection operator to our case study, we will extract the firewall  FW and the 
intrusion detection system IDS decision trees from the global RDTG. Let AttFW and Att IDS the set of 
attributes of FW
 
and
 
 IDS.We note that:  
 
AttFW={ Prtcl, Src address, Port src, Dest address, Port dest, Action}. 
AttID= {Packet length, Prtcl, Src address, Port src, Dest address, Port dest, Attack class, Action}. 
 
Let RDTG the relevant decision tree describing the global set of rules returned in step  H (see 
section 5.2). By applying the “component projection”, we have the following results: 
 
¯  For the firewall FW, branches b6 and b10 will be removed considering that the 
attribute  
FW
"Attack class" Att∉ . Also, the branch b12 will be removed considering that the 
attribute
FW
"Packet lenght" Att∉ .  
¯  For the intrusion detection system IDS, we will maintain all branches whose attribute 
Allass""Attack cl ≠ that are b6  , b10 and b12 .  
 
From the returned RDTFW, we will remove the labeled edges “All” because these edges are 
insignificant in the security component’s attributes. Contrary to that, RDTIDS remains unchanged 
considering that the set of used attributes represent Att
 IDS. 
 
Finally, RDTFW and  RDTIDS branches will be transformed into a set of rules. Table 5 and table 6 
represent FW and  IDS set of rules. 
 
 
Table 5. The firewall FW set of relevant rules 
 
 
Table 6. The intrusion detection system IDS set of relevant rules 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we have proposed a decision tree based approach to check security components 
interoperability in a network. The interoperability verification procedure is based on several 
processes; the first one proceeds with a formal specification, verification and correction of the 
security component’ set of rules. The second process checks the interoperability between several 
security components in the network. If the interoperability is not confirmed, the third process 
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removes the detected misconfiguration to guarantee the perfect interoperability between the 
security components in the network. So, our approach ensures, on one hand, the security 
component consistency and on the other hand, the consistency of the distributed security 
components in the network.  
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